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When a firm looking to hire staff goes to the labour market it has recourse to one or more 
recruitment channels. According to standard economic analyses, the diversity of recruitment 
channels partly arises from the various resources the market actors command : for example, 
small businesses draw on personal relations that are free-of-charge whereas major firms 
have the financial resources to pay for head-hunters. In such a framework, the homogeneous 
operation of the labour market and the homogeneous character of the channels are not 
called into question. Recruitment channels may be compared against the same yardstick, 
especially in terms of the speed with which they achieve matches between unemployed 
people and vacancies [Sabatier, 2003; De Varo, 2005]. Ultimately recruitment channels all 
do the same thing more or less efficiently, namely they convey information about the 
existence and quality of supply and demand to be matched, by specializing in job 
descriptions and job applications.  
The argument defended here, based on ‘the economics of convention’, is that channels 
produce different matches because they operate differently. In order to reduce uncertainty 
about the quality of matching, channels rely on ‘investment in forms’ [Thévenot, 1984]. The 
boundaries of the segmented labour market coincide with the boundaries of the labour 
supply that the recruitment channel can reach and it is described by the type of information 
the channel transmits. The first investment we identify corresponds to the boundaries of the 
labour market (segment) where a well-defined supply of and demand for labour come 
together. The second investment corresponds to the format that information takes on if it is 
to be understood by both sides of the market. The diversity of investment in forms that 
stabilizes the process of interactions via channels consequently induces a multiplicity of 
labour markets  with different matching dynamics.  
We develop this argument by drawing on a qualitative survey of recruitment practices in four 
service sectors (banking, computing, catering, and retailing [Larquier and Rieucau, 2014]). 
We describe the four matching processes that arise from them : (1) The standard market 
channels bring together vacancies and candidates on stabilized, even hard-and-fast criteria 
such as diploma and experience. In these cases, the channels have tools that can encode, 
process and disseminate information over a mass of offers and applications. (2) When firms 
resort to an institutional intermediary to solve their recruiting difficulties, this requires  
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shaping a labour supply either by education and training or by redefining expectations with 
respect to candidates in connection with the professional life in the field. In such a matching 
dynamic, resort to a channel necessarily takes the form of a partnership, of mounting an 
operation that takes time and may involve various types of actors (firms, public-sector 
intermediaries, local authorities, training centres). (3) When firms rely on a neighbourhood 
market, the chances of matching depend on the trust placed in those making 
recommendations and the absence of ‘quality’ proximity networks thwarts any matching. In 
this case, there is no professional or experienced intermediary; anyone can help in making a 
match. (4) When the firm is looking to a familiar professional market, the question of trust in 
the person making the recommendation does not arise as in the previous instance. Here the 
chances of matching depend on a personalized and professional language that is shared by 
the recruitment partners. In this last case, it is the professionals themselves who are the 
relevant intermediaries for matching. Recognizing the specificity of matching processes is 
useful to better understand labour markets inequalities. 
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